Do Manufacturers Pollute Less Under the Regulation-Through-Information Regime? What Plant-Level Data Tell Us
Do Manufacturers Pollute Less Under the Regulation-Through-Information Regime? What Plant-Level Data Tell Us
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在信息监管制度下，制造商的污染会减少吗？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1533-8525.2004.tb02299.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Andrew W. Jones
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Grant;Andrew W. Jones
由于过去关于知情权法律影响的研究依赖于高度汇总的数据，因此尚不清楚位于拥有资助的知情权计划的州是否会对单个制造工厂的环境绩效产生重大影响。也没有证据表明，如果不考虑已知会增加污染的其他植物特性，这种影响是否存在。为了纠正这种情况，我们使用了EPA有毒物质排放清单中的工厂级数据来测试各州在1990年和2000年对化工厂有毒物质排放的知情权计划的影响。一些组织理论（新制度主义、组织生态学和资源依赖框架）强调监管政策只是影响组织的几种制度力量之一，我们的研究结果表明，各州的知情权计划对工厂的有毒排放没有显著的净影响。除了对信息披露法的有效性提出质疑外，我们的研究结果还强调了将污染作为一种组织现象来处理，并研究污染最直接影响环境的组织（生产现场）的重要性。
Because past studies on the effects of right-to-know laws have relied on highly aggregated data, it is still unknown whether being located in a state with a funded right-to-know program has a significant effect on the environmental performance of individual manufacturing plants. Nor has it been shown that such effects exist net of other plant characteristics that are known to increase pollution. To remedy this situation, we have used plant-level data from the EPA's Toxics Release Inventory to test the effects of states' right-to-know programs on the toxic emissions of chemical plants in 1990 and 2000. Consistent with several organizational theories (neoinstitutionalism, organizational ecology, and the resource dependence framework) that stress how regulatory policies are just one of several institutional forces that bear on organizations, our findings reveal that states' right-to-know programs have had no significant net effect on plants' toxic emissions. In addition to raising questions about the efficacy of information disclosure laws, our results underscore the importance of approaching pollution as an organizational phenomenon and studying organizations where they most directly impact the environment-at the site of production.