Faster Secure Two-Party Computation in the Single-Execution Setting
Faster Secure Two-Party Computation in the Single-Execution Setting
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-56617-7_14
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发表时间：
2017-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
X. Wang;A. Malozemoff;Jonathan Katz
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文献类型：
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作者：
X. Wang;A. Malozemoff;Jonathan Katz
我们提出了一个新的协议，双方计算，安全的恶意对手，这是显着快于以前的工作，在单执行设置（即，未摊销且无预处理）。特别是，对于计算安全参数和统计安全参数，我们的协议只使用乱码电路和公钥操作，而以前的工作与相同数量的乱码电路需要要么公钥操作（其中输入/输出长度）或第二次执行的安全计算子协议。我们的协议可以基于标准模型中的决策Diffie-Hellman假设，我们实现了我们的协议来评估它的性能。与，我们的实现安全地计算AES评估在65毫秒在局域网上使用一个线程没有任何预先计算，比最好的工作在非摊销设置更快。我们的协议的相对性能甚至更好的功能与较大的输入/输出长度。
We propose a new protocol for two-party computation, secure against malicious adversaries, that is significantly faster than prior work in the single-execution setting (i.e., non-amortized and with no pre-processing). In particular, for computational security parameterand statistical security parameter, our protocol uses onlygarbled circuits andpublic-key operations, whereas previous work with the same number of garbled circuits required eitherpublic-key operations (wherenis the input/output length) or a second execution of a secure-computation sub-protocol. Our protocol can be based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model.We implement our protocol to evaluate its performance. With, our implementation securely computes an AES evaluation in 65 ms over a local-area network using a single thread without any pre-computation,faster than the best prior work in the non-amortized setting. The relative performance of our protocol is even better for functions with larger input/output lengths.