Congestion pricing and capacity for internationally interlinked airports
Congestion pricing and capacity for internationally interlinked airports
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DOI：
10.1016/j.trb.2020.10.006
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发表时间：
2020-12
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
M. Lin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Lin
本研究针对连接两国机场与航空公司的国际航线网路，探讨拥挤收费与容量投资。根据Bertrand-Nash假设的机场和古诺竞争的航空公司在一个双头垄断，我们的特点是当地最优的定价规则，统一和歧视性收费征收每个国家的机场。我们澄清，本地最优定价规则包括一个重要的组成部分，从激励利用外国航空公司，这是不包括在社会/全球福利最大化的权威机构设置的最优定价规则。我们评估往返行程的两个机场费用的定价规则（即，每个机场每名离港旅客收费的总和）。我们澄清，无论统一或歧视性收费的定价制度，从理论上讲，利用外国航空公司的激励是偏离全球福利最大化（可能达到第一个最好的结果）的唯一来源。此外，我们表明，每个机场的跑道容量投资可能是全球最优定价规则下的全球有效的，而每个机场往往过度投资下的局部最优定价规则。
This study investigates congestion pricing and capacity investment for an international network linking two countries’ airports and airlines. Under a Bertrand-Nash supposition for airports and Cournot competition for airlines in a duopoly, we characterize the locally optimal pricing rules for uniform and discriminatory charges levied by each country's airport. We clarify that the locally optimal pricing rules include a significant component resulting from the incentive to exploit the foreign airline, which is not included in the optimal pricing rules set by a social/global welfare-maximizing authority. We evaluate the pricing rules of the two airport charges for a round trip (i.e., the sum of each airport's per-departing-passenger charge). We clarify that the incentive to exploit the foreign airline is, theoretically, the only source of deviation from global welfare maximization (which may reach the first-best outcome) regardless of the uniform or discriminatory charges’ pricing regimes. Furthermore, we show that each airport's runway capacity investment could be globally efficient under globally optimal pricing rules, whereas each airport tends to overinvest under locally optimal pricing rules.