An economic welfare analysis of demand response in the PJM electricity market
An economic welfare analysis of demand response in the PJM electricity market
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DOI：
10.1016/j.enpol.2008.06.036
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发表时间：
2008-10-01
期刊：
影响因子：
9
通讯作者：
Fernands, Stephen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Walawalkar, Rahul;Blumsack, Seth;Fernands, Stephen
我们使用经济需求-响应(DR)市场数据分析了美国PJM电力市场经济需求-响应(DR)计划的经济特性。PJM的计划为那些响应价格信号而减少负荷的客户提供补贴。该计划纳入了一个“触发点”，边际价格为75美元/兆瓦时，超过或超过该点的减负费用包括补贴支付。特别是在高峰时段，这样的计划为系统节省了资金，但涉及的补贴给市场带来了扭曲。我们模拟需求侧竞价进入PJM市场，并利用2006年的负荷和价格数据将社会福利收益与支付给价格敏感型负荷的补贴进行比较，最大的经济效应是财富从发电商转移到非价格敏感型负荷。根据2007年底有效的激励性支付结构，我们估计社会福利收益超过了补贴带来的扭曲。降低触发点增加了从发电商到消费者的转移，但可能会导致补贴超过负荷削减带来的社会福利收益。我们估计，激励触发点的社会最佳范围将是66-77美元/兆瓦时。(C)2008爱思唯尔有限公司。保留所有权利。
We analyze the economic properties of the economic demand-response (DR) program in the PJM electricity market in the United States using DR market data. PJM's program provided subsidies to customers who reduced load in response to price signals. The program incorporated a "trigger point", at a locational marginal price of $75/MWh, at or beyond which payments for load reduction included a subsidy payment. Particularly during peak hours, such a program saves money for the system, but the subsidies involved introduce distortions into the market. We simulate demand-side bidding into the PJM market, and compare the social welfare gains with the subsidies paid to price-responsive load using load and price data for year 2006, The largest economic effect is wealth transfers from generators to non price-responsive loads. Based on the incentive payment structure that was in effect through the end of 2007, we estimate that the social welfare gains exceed the distortions introduced by the subsidies. Lowering the trigger point increases the transfer from generators to consumers, but may result in the subsidy outweighing the social welfare gains due to load curtailment. We estimate that the socially optimal range for the incentive trigger point would be $66-77/MWh. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.