On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design
On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design
复制标题
论单参数机制设计中的收入福利比
DOI：
10.1145/2482540.2482584
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yang Yuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Robert D. Kleinberg;Yang Yuan
一个环境中潜在的社会盈余的哪一部分可以被收入最大化的垄断者攫取？我们在具有独立私有值的贝叶斯单参数环境中研究这个问题。这个问题的精确答案显然取决于环境的具体情况：可行性约束和投标人私人价值的抽样分布。我们的工作不是解决特定情况下的问题，而是旨在提供收入与福利比率的普遍下限，该下限在允许不平凡的此类界限的最一般假设下成立。
我们的结果可总结如下。对于一般的可行性约束，收入福利比至少是常数乘以代理数量的平方根倒数，并且这严格限制于常数因子。对于向下封闭的可行性约束，收入福利比受常数限制。这两个结果都要求投标人的分布满足比正则性更强的假设；我们证明后一个结果不能避免这个要求。
What fraction of the potential social surplus in an environment can be extracted by a revenue-maximizing monopolist? We investigate this problem in Bayesian single-parameter environments with independent private values. The precise answer to the question obviously depends on the particulars of the environment: the feasibility constraint and the distributions from which the bidders' private values are sampled. Rather than solving the problem in particular special cases, our work aims to provide universal lower bounds on the revenue-to-welfare ratio that hold under the most general hypotheses that allow for non-trivial such bounds.
Our results can be summarized as follows. For general feasibility constraints, the revenue-to-welfare ratio is at least a constant times the inverse-square-root of the number of agents, and this is tight up to constant factors. For downward-closed feasibility constraints, the revenue-to-welfare ratio is bounded below by a constant. Both results require the bidders' distributions to satisfy hypotheses somewhat stronger than regularity; we show that the latter result cannot avoid this requirement.