DynaFlow: An Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense Based on Dynamically-Adjusting Flows

DynaFlow: An Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense Based on Dynamically-Adjusting Flows
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DynaFlow:一种基于动态调整流量的高效网站指纹防御

DOI:
10.1145/3267323.3268960
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
S. Devadas
S. Devadas
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
David Lu;Sanjit Bhat;Albert Kwon;S. Devadas

文献摘要

被引文献

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网站指纹攻击使本地攻击者能够确定 Tor 用户访问哪个网站。近年来,一些研究人员提出了应对这些攻击的防御措施。然而,这些防御措施也有缺点:许多防御措施不提供正式的安全保证,会产生高延迟和带宽开销,并且需要经常更新的网站流量模式数据库。在这项工作中,我们引入了一种新的对策 DynaFlow,它基于动态调整流量来防止网站指纹识别。 DynaFlow 提供与当前最先进技术相似的安全级别,同时效率提高 40% 以上。同时,DynaFlow不需要预先建立的数据库,并将保护范围扩展到动态生成的网站。
Website fingerprinting attacks enable a local adversary to determine which website a Tor user visits. In recent years, several researchers have proposed defenses to counter these attacks. However, these defenses have shortcomings: many do not provide formal guarantees of security, incur high latency and bandwidth overheads, and require a frequently-updated database of website traffic patterns. In this work, we introduce a new countermeasure, DynaFlow, based on dynamically-adjusting flows to protect against website fingerprinting. DynaFlow provides a similar level of security as current state-of-the-art while being over 40% more efficient. At the same time, DynaFlow does not require a pre-established database and extends protection to dynamically-generated websites.