CIVSCOPE: Analyzing Potential Memory Corruption Bugs in Compartment Interfaces
CIVSCOPE: Analyzing Potential Memory Corruption Bugs in Compartment Interfaces
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CIVSCOPE：分析隔间接口中潜在的内存损坏错误
DOI：
10.1145/3625275.3625399
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Chien Y
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chien Y
分隔化将程序分解为单独的部分，通过分隔接口进行交互-隐藏信息，否则可以从受损组件访问。不幸的是，大多数代码都没有将其接口作为信任边界来开发。如果不加检查，这些接口暴露混乱的代理攻击，从恶意输入的数据流可以强制一个车厢进入访问以前隐藏的信息，代表不受信任的caller.We引入一种新的程序分析模型，通过车厢接口的数据流，自动和全面地找到和测量从车厢绕过数据流的攻击面。使用这种分析，我们检查Linux内核沿着不同的隔间边界和特征的脆弱性程度。我们发现有许多隔间旁路路径（395/4394驱动器接口有22741个路径），无法手动校正。我们介绍CIVSCOPE作为一个全面的和健全的方法来分析和发现下限和潜在的上限与隔间边界接口的内存操作的风险。
Compartmentalization decomposes a program into separate parts with mediated interactions through compartment interfaces---hiding information that would otherwise be accessible from a compromised component. Unfortunately, most code was not developed assuming its interfaces as trust boundaries. Left unchecked, these interfaces expose confused deputy attacks where data flowing from malicious inputs can coerce a compartment into accessing previously hidden information on-behalf-of the untrusted caller.We introduce a novel program analysis that models data flows through compartment interfaces to automatically and comprehensively find and measure the attack surface from compartment bypassing data flows. Using this analysis we examine the Linux kernel along diverse compartment boundaries and characterize the degree of vulnerability. We find that there are many compartment bypassing paths (395/4394driver interfaces have22741paths), making it impossible to correct by hand. We introduce CIVSCOPE as a comprehensive and sound approach to analyze and uncover the lower-bound and potential upper-bound risks associated with the memory operations in compartment boundary interfaces.
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