Fraud, Market Reaction, and the Role of Institutional Investors in Chinese Listed Firms
Fraud, Market Reaction, and the Role of Institutional Investors in Chinese Listed Firms
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DOI：
10.3905/jpm.2015.41.5.092
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发表时间：
2014-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Reena Aggarwal;May Hu;Jingjing Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Reena Aggarwal;May Hu;Jingjing Yang
中国上市公司财务舞弊的程度和类型，股票市场对舞弊的发现和公告的反应，以及机构所有权与财务舞弊之间的关系是本文的主题。利用2001年至2011年期间的欺诈数据，作者发现欺诈现象普遍存在，并且在公告之日市场反应强烈，特别是在严重欺诈的情况下。在独立董事比例较小的公司和业绩不佳的公司中，欺诈更有可能发生。共同基金拥有率较高的公司随后欺诈事件较少。我们的研究结果表明，独立机构（如共同基金）的所有权作为一种有效的监督机制，在中国资本市场上起到了遏制欺诈和加强公司治理的作用。
The extent and type of financial fraud committed by listed firms in China, stock market reaction to the detection and announcement of fraud, and the association between institutional ownership and financial fraud are the subjects of this article. Using fraud data from the period between 2001 and 2011, the authors find wide occurrences of fraud and a strong negative market reaction on the announcement date, particularly in cases of serious fraud. Fraud is more likely to occur at firms that have a smaller proportion of independent directors and at poorly performing firms. Firms with higher mutual fund ownership subsequently have fewer incidences of fraud. Our results reports by the authors indicate that ownership by independent institutions, such as mutual funds, serves as an effective monitoring mechanism, deterring fraud and enhancing corporate governance in Chinese capital markets.