Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament
Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament
复制标题
点头或针刺：分析威权议会中代表的反应
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
P. Schuler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Edmund J. Malesky;P. Schuler
最近的学术界认为，确保独裁政权长寿和经济增长的一个解决方案是通过在国家立法机构中给予他们有限的政策影响力来拉拢潜在的反对派。虽然拉拢理论产生了一些预测的代表行为在一个专制的议会，这种制度的不透明性进行了实证证实困难。我们通过利用越南国会质询会议的记录来解决这个问题，代表们在国会就当天的重要问题向总理和内阁成员提问。使用查询的内容分析，我们提供了第一个实证测试的代表行为在非民主议会。我们发现，一些代表表现出的行为与拉拢理论一致，积极参与会议，展示批评当局，并回应当地选民的需求。然而，这种响应性是由提名、选举和向个人代表分配议会职责的制度规则参数化的。
Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the prime minister and Cabinet members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in nondemocratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with cooptation theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.