Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest
Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest
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职业许可和公共利益
DOI：
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发表时间：
1974
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
A. Maurizi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Maurizi
在立法机关看来，职业许可是正当的，因为它保护了公共利益;然而，通常是商品或服务的生产者向州立法机关提出这一论点。这并不令人惊讶，因为正如其他人已经指出的那样，典型的消费者在多一个职业的许可证中遭受的财富损失（以更高价格的形式）可能太小（弗里德曼，1962，第143页）。最终的结果是促进了生产者群体的利益，而不是公众的利益。虽然这是我们经济学家所期望的，但在我们的案例中取得进展的主要困难是试图说服立法机构，获得许可证的职业确实利用他们的权力以牺牲消费者为代价来促进自己的财富。这是本文的目的，在这一点上提出证据，以便与州立法者讨论这个问题的基本规则可以改变。首先，有必要介绍我用来检验和评价数据的理论仪器。首先应该指出的是，我的模型中的一些要素在一个非常有趣的早期研究中提到了许可证的目的。特别是，摩尔（1961，第112页）表达了这样一个命题：“对职业的需求越大，许可证的回报就越大。“摩尔的结论是，证据表明许可证的倾向与其货币回报无关（1961年，第113页）。我更精确地阐述了这一假设，并使用了摩尔使用的同一研究中的附录数据，但他忽略了分析这些附录数据（州政府理事会，1952年，第92页）;我的调查倾向于支持他的调查未能支持的同一基本假设。
Occupational licensing has been justifiable in the view of legislatures on the grounds that it protects the public interest; often, however, it is the producers of the good or service who present this argument to the state legislatures. This is hardly surprising, since the typical consumer is likely to suffer too small a wealth loss (in the form of higher prices) in the licensing of one more occupation, as has already been pointed out by others (Friedman 1962, p. 143). The end result is the promotion of the interests of the producer group rather than those of the public. Though this is what we economists would expect to happen, the principal difficulty in making progress with our case has been in trying to convince legislatures that the occupations receiving licenses do use their power to promote their own wealth at the expense of the consumer. It is the purpose of this paper to present evidence on this point in order that the ground rules for discussing the problem with state legislators can be altered. It will first be necessary to present the theoretical apparatus with which I will inspect and evaluate the data. It should be noted at the outset that some of the ingredients of my model were mentioned in one very interesting earlier study of the purpose of licensing. In particular, Moore (1961, p. 112) expressed the proposition that "the more demand is growing for the occupation, the greater the return from licensing." Moore concluded that the evidence indicated the tendency to license was not correlated with its monetary return (1961, p. 113). I have formulated the hypothesis somewhat more precisely and have used appendix data from the same study utilized by Moore but which appendix data he neglected to analyze (Council of State Governments 1952, p. 92); my investigation tends to support the same basic hypothesis which his investigation failed to support.