Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated
Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated
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奇迹与模型：为什么结构现实主义死亡的报道可能被夸大了
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发表时间：
2007
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Worrall
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文献类型：
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作者：
J. Worrall
对于我们最成功的科学理论，如广义相对论或量子力学，我们应该相信什么呢？它们是真实的，或者至少是近似真实的？或者仅仅是因为他们成功地“拯救了现象”，通过“经验上的充分”？在早期的工作中，我探索了一种称为结构科学实在论（以下简称SSR）的观点的吸引力。这一观点认为，我们有理由相信，我们成功的理论在结构上（大致）是正确的（而且这也是关于它们的最强的认识论主张，可以合理地作出）。在本文的第一部分，我将详细解释这一论点的含义，并概述它为什么看起来有吸引力的原因。第二部分概述了在最近（我们将看到，在某些情况下，不是最近）的文献中对安全部门改革提出的一些批评;第三部分也是最后一部分认为，尽管这些批评最初似乎令人深感不安（或更糟），但这一立场仍然可行。
What is it reasonable to believe about our most successful scientific theories such as the general theory of relativity or quantum mechanics? That they are true, or at any rate approximately true? Or only that they successfully ‘save the phenomena’, by being ‘empirically adequate’? In earlier work I explored the attractions of a view called Structural Scientific Realism (hereafter: SSR). This holds that it is reasonable to believe that our successful theories are (approximately) structurally correct (and also that this is the strongest epistemic claim about them that it is reasonable to make). In the first part of this paper I shall explain in some detail what this thesis means and outline the reasons why it seems attractive. The second section outlines a number of criticisms that have none the less been brought against SSR in the recent (and as we shall see, in some cases, not so recent) literature; and the third and final section argues that, despite the fact that these criticisms might seem initially deeply troubling (or worse), the position remains viable.