On a folk theory of society: Children, evolution, and mental representations of social groups
On a folk theory of society: Children, evolution, and mental representations of social groups
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DOI：
10.1207/s15327957pspr0502_2
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发表时间：
2001-01-01
影响因子：
10.8
通讯作者：
Hirschfeld, LA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hirschfeld, LA
对社会世界的描述和推理是幼儿的一项主要任务，几乎可以肯定的是，这项任务涉及专门的知识结构。互动中的个体是社会性的基本要素，不出所料，进化使儿童具备了吸引人们注意和处理关于个人的信息的特殊目的机制。社会集合体也是人类社会性的基本要素，但我们对儿童对它们的掌握以及在它们之间进行调节的机构知之甚少，这种空白的一个原因是，研究人员通常根据儿童的理解有多像(或不是成年人)来构建儿童的社会知识框架。本文提出，从儿童自身或自身的角度来探讨儿童的社会知识可能更有成效。可以说，即使是非常年幼的孩子，也会运用社会的俗套理论，这些理论来自于一个特殊目的的内生模块，用于识别和推理人类聚集体。
Representing and reasoning about the social universe is a major task for the young child, one that almost certainly involves specialized knowledge structures. Individuals in interaction are fundamental elements of sociality, and, unsurprisingly, evolution has prepared children with special-purpose mechanisms for drawing attention to and processing information about persons. Social aggregates are also fundamental elements of human sociality, yet we know much less about the child's grasp of them and the institutions that mediate among them, One reason for this lacuna is that researchers have typically framed children's social knowledge according To how adultlike (or not) that understanding is. This article proposes that it may be more productive to approach children's social knowledge from the perspective of the child herself or himself. Arguably, even quite young children deploy lay theories of society that emerge from a special-purpose endogenous module for identifying and reasoning about human aggregates.