Are temporal concepts embodied? A challenge for cognitive neuroscience
Are temporal concepts embodied? A challenge for cognitive neuroscience
复制标题
DOI：
10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00240
复制
发表时间：
2010-01-01
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Chatterjee, Anjan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kranjec, Alexander;Chatterjee, Anjan
时间是一个具体的概念吗？人们经常从空间的角度谈论和思考时间概念。这一观察结果，沿着语言学和实验行为学的数据记录了空间和时间之间的密切概念关系，通常被解释为时间概念是具体化的证据。然而，几乎没有神经数据支持我们的时间概念是基于感觉运动表征的想法。缺乏证据可能是因为我们还不清楚具体的时间概念应该如何在大脑中表达。本文件的特点是各种证据，将支持或挑战体现帐户的时间。主要的兴趣是关于（1）是否空间，作为时间的中介概念，本身是最好的理解为体现和（2）体现理论是否应该试图绕过空间，通过研究时间概念的神经系统，实例化的时间知觉的基础。
Is time an embodied concept? People often talk and think about temporal concepts in terms of space. This observation, along with linguistic and experimental behavioral data documenting a close conceptual relation between space and time, is often interpreted as evidence that temporal concepts are embodied. However, there is little neural data supporting the idea that our temporal concepts are grounded in sensorimotor representations. This lack of evidence may be because it is still unclear how an embodied concept of time should be expressed in the brain. The present paper sets out to characterize the kinds of evidence that would support or challenge embodied accounts of time. Of main interest are theoretical issues concerning (1) whether space, as a mediating concept for time, is itself best understood as embodied and (2) whether embodied theories should attempt to bypass space by investigating temporal conceptual grounding in neural systems that instantiate time perception.