Bonus Payments, on-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employment in Japan
Bonus Payments, on-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employment in Japan
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日本的奖金支付、在职培训和终身雇佣
DOI：
10.1086/260813
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发表时间：
1979
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
M. Hashimoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Hashimoto
日本普遍采用奖金形式的灵活工资，这是因为特定人力资本投资的高利润率以及雇主和工人在评估生产率波动时面临的交易成本较低。建立了在职培训模型来分析特定人力资本投资金额的确定和分配。该模型预测，投资盈利能力的提高会导致红利收益比的提高。有证据表明，教育和公司规模（通常被认为与日本在职培训的盈利能力呈正相关）以及在当前公司的多年经验与奖金收入比率具有显着的正相关关系。观察到的生产指数周期性敏感性与红利盈利比率之间的正相关关系也支持了这一理论。
The prevalence in Japan of flexible wages in the form of bonus payments is explained by a high profitability of investment in specific human capital together with the low costs of transactions facing the employer and the worker in assessing fluctuations in productivities. A model of on-the-job training is developed to analyze the determination of the amounts and the sharing of investment in specific human capital. The model predicts that increased profitability of investment leads to an increased bonus-earnings ratio. Evidence indicates that education and firm size, which are often said to be positively associated with the profitability of on-the-job training in Japan, as well as years of experience in the current firm, have significant positive associations with the bonus-earnings ratio. An observed positive association between the cyclical sensitivities in a production index and in the bonus-earnings ratio also supports the theory.