Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting on Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market.
Advantageous Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurer Sorting on Risk in the U.S. Automobile Insurance Market.
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美国汽车保险市场的优势选择、道德风险与保险公司风险排序。
DOI：
10.1111/jori.12170
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eldred,LindseyM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sloan,FrankA;Robinson,PatriciaA;Eldred,LindseyM
摘要这项研究使用主观信念、风险偏好、鲁莽驾驶、受访者的保险公司以及保险单特征等数据，结合独立组织分发的保险公司特定质量评级，量化了私人信息在汽车保险政策选择中的作用。我们发现事故后风险和保险范围之间的零相关性，反映了道德风险抵消了政策选择的有利选择。谨慎的选择部分归因于保险公司对保险公司已知和使用的消费者属性进行分类。我们对保险公司排序的分析表明，保险公司观察到的属性上的低风险驱动因素从具有较高质量评级的保险公司获得保险。
ABSTRACTThis study quantifies the role of private information in automobile insurance policy choice using data on subjective beliefs, risk preference, reckless driving, the respondent's insurer, and insurance policy characteristics merged with insurer‐specific quality ratings distributed by independent organizations. We find a zero correlation betweenex postaccident risk and insurance coverage, reflecting advantageous selection in policy choice offset by moral hazard. Advantageous selection is partly attributable to insurer sorting on consumer attributes known and used by insurers. Our analysis of insurer sorting reveals that lower‐risk drivers on attributes observed by insurers obtain coverage from insurers with higher‐quality ratings.