Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior
Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior
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DOI：
10.1007/s10997-012-9226-5
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发表时间：
2014-02
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
F. Mizutani;Eri Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Mizutani;Eri Nakamura
本研究的主要目的是调查组织冗余是如何产生的以及它如何影响公司的绩效。为了解决这些问题，我们构建了三个方程：管理激励函数、组织冗余形成函数和绩效函数，并利用2001年和2006年2791家日本企业的数据集同时对这些函数应用3SLS。通过对这些日本企业的实证分析，我们得到以下结果：随着组织冗余的增加，企业的绩效下降；组织冗余受到收入年变化率的影响，但不受管理激励的影响；管理层激励随着公司业绩的提高而减少，而随着公司治理结构的加强而增加。
The main purpose of this study is to investigate how organizational slack is created and how it affects a firm’s performance. To address these questions, we construct three equations: managerial incentive function, organizational slack formation function and performance function, and we apply 3SLS simultaneously to these functions by using the data sets of 2,791 Japanese firms from the years 2001 and 2006. From the empirical analysis of these Japanese firms, we obtain the following results: a firm’s performance declines as organizational slack increases; organizational slack is affected by annual change rate of revenues but not by managerial incentive; managerial incentive decreases as a firm’s performance improves while it increases as the structure of corporate governance is strengthened.