“OSTRICH NOMINALISM” OR “MIRAGE REALISM”?
“OSTRICH NOMINALISM” OR “MIRAGE REALISM”?
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“鸵鸟唯名论”还是“海市蜃楼现实主义”？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00031.x
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发表时间：
1980
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Michael Devitt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael Devitt
D.阿姆斯特朗对“共性问题”的看法是暂时的：他把它留给了“全科学……”以确定有哪些共性。“然而，他对这一问题的看法表明，他是“旧时代”形而上学的奉献者。这个问题是一个传统的问题，据说是由“柏拉图一对一”的前提提出的：“许多不同的细节都可能具有似乎相同的性质”(P.XIII)。遗憾的是，阿姆斯特朗没有认真考虑韦夫·奎因和其他人的“新”形而上学，根据这些形而上学，没有阿姆斯特朗试图解决的问题。在我看来，这个奎因的观点与阿姆斯特朗关于普遍的现实主义的竞争要强得多，他仔细摧毁了许多其他的观点。我们关心的共性是性质(奎因称之为“属性”)和关系。“现实主义者”相信它们。“无名论者”则不这么认为。在概述了五种唯名论之后，阿姆斯特朗在题为“鸵鸟或隐形匕首无名论”的标题下提到了奎因的第六种观点：
D,'av id Armstrong’s approach to “the problem of universals” has a contem porary gloss: he leaves it to “total science... to determine what universals there are.” Nevertheless his conception of the problem shows him to be a devotee of the “old-time” metaphysics. The problem is the traditional one allegedly posed by the premise of “Platos One over Many ar gument”:“Many different particulars can all have what appears to be the same nature”(p. xiii).'It is a pity that Armstrong takes no serious account of the “new” metaphysics of WV Quine and others according to which there is no such problem as Armstrong seeks to solve.^ In my view this Quinean position is a much stronger rival to Armstrong’s Realism about universals than the many others he carefully demolishes.The universals we are concerned with here are properties (what Quine calls “attributes”) and relations.“Realists” believe in them,“Nominalists” don’t. After outlining five versions of Nominalism, Armstrong mentions the Quinean position as a possible sixth under the title “Ostrich or Cloak-and-dagger Nom inalism”: