Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity
Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity
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真正的演员可以玩的游戏：复杂性的挑战
DOI：
10.1177/0951692891003003003
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发表时间：
1991
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
F. Scharpf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Scharpf
本文继续检验实证社会科学和政策研究中博弈论解释的有效性。假设具有有限理性的真实行动者无法应对多人博弈的爆炸性复杂性，讨论的重点是公司行动者和联盟，以及集体甚至聚合行动者可以被合法地视为单一参与者的条件。此外，还探讨了功能分化和内群体-外群体分割对于游戏式互动隔离的重要性。
This paper continues the examination of the validity of game-theoretic explanations in empirical social science and policy research. Assuming that real actors with bounded rationality would be unable to cope with the explosive complexity of n-person games, discussion focuses on the conditions under which corporate actors and coalitions, as well as collective and even aggregate actors, may be legitimately treated as unitary players. In addition, the importance of functional differentiation and ingroup-outgroup segmentation for the segregation of game-like interactions is explored.