Who Appoints Them, What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan
Who Appoints Them, What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00043.x
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发表时间：
2002-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Y. Miwa;J. Ramseyer
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文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Miwa;J. Ramseyer
尽管改革者经常声称日本公司任命的外部董事效率低下，但市场竞争的逻辑却表明并非如此。考虑到日本的产品、服务和资本市场的竞争力，能够存活下来的企业应该是那些倾向于任命接近本公司最佳结构的董事会的企业。由此引发的争论提出了一个检验标准：是否有更多外部人员的公司会做得更好？如果日本企业的外部人员数量维持在次优水平，那么外部人员多的企业应该比外部人员少的企业表现更好;如果市场约束反而促使企业向特定的最优水平发展，那么企业特征可能决定董事会结构，但企业绩效与董事会结构之间应该没有明显的关系。我们探讨了1986年至1994年的1000家最大的日本上市公司的数据的问题。我们首先询问哪些公司倾向于任命哪些外部人士进入董事会。我们发现这些约会绝对不是随机的。当公司大量借贷、可抵押资产较少或本身就从事服务业和金融业时，它们会任命来自银行业的董事。当他们从事建筑业时，他们会任命退休的政府官员，并将其大部分产品出售给政府机构;当他们拥有一个占主导地位的母公司时，或者当他们从事建筑业时，他们会任命其他退休的企业高管，并将大量产品出售给私营部门。耦合OLS回归与两阶段估计的一个子集的数据，然后我们问是否有更多的外部董事的公司优于那些少，并发现他们没有。相反，回归最重要的是正如市场竞争的逻辑所预测的那样公司选择适合他们的董事会。版权所有Blackwell出版社2005年。
Although reformers often claim Japanese firms appoint inefficiently few outside directors, the logic of market competition suggests otherwise. Given the competitive product, service, and capital markets in Japan, the firms that survive should disproportionately be firms that tend to appoint boards approaching their firm-specifically optimal structure. The resulting debate thus suggests a test: do firms with more outsiders do better? If Japanese firms do maintain suboptimal numbers of outsiders, then those with more outsiders should outperform those with fewer; if market constraints instead drive them toward their firm-specific optimum, then firm characteristics may determine board structure, but firm performance should show no observable relation to that structure. We explore the issue with data on the 1000 largest exchange-listed Japanese firms from 1986 to 1994. We first ask which firms tend to appoint which outsiders to their boards. We find the appointments decidedly nonrandom. Firms appoint directors from the banking industry when they borrow heavily, when they have fewer mortgageable assets, or when they are themselves in the service and finance industry. They appoint retired government bureaucrats when they are in construction and sell a large fraction of their output to government agencies, and they appoint other retired business executives when they have a dominant parent corporation or when they are in the construction industry and sell heavily to the private sector. Coupling OLS regressions with two-stage estimates on a subset of the data, we then ask whether the firms with more outside directors outperform those with fewer, and find that they do not. Instead, the regressions suggest-exactly as the logic of market competition predicts-that firms choose boards appropriate to them. Copyright Blackwell Publishing 2005.