Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt
Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt
复制标题
担保债务清算的策略和力量
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.10497
复制
发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
Ronald J. Mann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ronald J. Mann
本文对担保债务的清偿过程进行了实证和理论研究。研究的实证部分包括从三家贷款机构（一家金融公司，一家银行和一家保险公司）的投资组合中随机选择的74个不良担保贷款概况的实证基础。这些简介包括关于放款人如何决定终止哪些贷款、放款人决定终止关系后债务人会发生什么情况、放款人在获得还款方面的成功程度以及终止过程的费用等专题的信息。研究的理论部分以两种方式建立在经验证据的基础上。第一部分的理论讨论提出了一个经济学模型的不良债务。我认为，债务人即使在面对贷款人的付款要求时，也有能力保护自己，这是令人惊讶的，因为在我的交易档案中，债务人要么对贷款进行再融资，要么用持续经营或销售基础抵押品产生的现金流来偿还贷款。作为一个相关的点，我认为，极差的结果贷款人面临的情况下，他们取消抵押品赎回权反驳了一些学者的关注，贷款人的能力，利用抵押品赎回权，以捕捉有价值的资产，从他们的借款人。理论讨论的第二部分涉及更广泛的问题，即不良债务市场与更大的初始债务发行市场之间的联系。首先，基于非常低的频率的清算和穷人的结果，贷款人获得的清算，我认为，主要原因，贷款人采取抵押品的战略优势，它给他们的权力，以武力清算抵押品的增强是如此之小的价值，它不能合理地被视为这些交易的一般理由。因此，担保信贷制度的法律的改革应更多地侧重于这些战略优势所引起的严重政策问题，而不是在获得可靠的清算权方面所认识到的困难。最后，我想谈谈一个长期存在的关注，即阻碍债权人收回款项的规则会影响贷款人发放新贷款的意愿。我的证据表明，企业倒闭和破产的频率很低，这有力地表明，这种担忧在很大程度上是没有根据的。
This article provides an empirical and theoretical study of the processes for the liquidation of secured debt. The empirical portion of the study includes an empirical base of 74 profiles of distressed secured loans randomly selected from the portfolios of three lenders (one finance company, one bank, and one insurance company). Those profiles include information on such topics as how the lenders decide which loans to terminate, what happens to the debtors after the lender decides to terminate the relationships, how successful the lenders are in obtaining repayment, and how much the process of termination costs. The theoretical portion of the study builds on the base of empirical evidence in two ways. The first part of the theoretical discussion presents a model of the economics of distressed debt. I argue that debtors are surprisingly capable of protecting themselves even in the face of demands for payment from their lenders, relying on the substantial incidence in my profiles of transactions where the debtors either refinanced their loans or paid them off with cash flow generated from continued operations or sale of the underlying collateral. As a related point, I argue that extremely poor results lenders face in cases where they foreclose rebut the concerns of some academics about the ability of lenders to use foreclosure to capture valuable assets from their borrowers. The second part of the theoretical discussion addresses broader questions about the connection between the market for distressed debt and the larger market for the initial issuance of debt. First, based on the very low frequency of liquidation and the poor results that lenders obtain on liquidation, I argue that the principal reasons that lenders take collateral are the strategic advantages it gives them; the enhancement of their power to liquidate collateral by force is of so little value that it cannot plausibly be viewed as a general justification for those transactions. Accordingly, legal reforms of the secured-credit system should focus more on the serious policy issues raised by those strategic advantages than on perceived difficulties in obtaining a reliable right to liquidate. I close by addressing the long-standing concern that rules hindering creditors' collection efforts will affect the willingness of lenders to issue new loans. My evidence of the low frequency of business failure and bankruptcy strongly suggests that the concern is for the most part unfounded.