STANDARDS OF JUSTICE AND QUALITY OF POWER IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA SITUATION
STANDARDS OF JUSTICE AND QUALITY OF POWER IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA SITUATION
复制标题
社会困境中的正义标准和权力质量
DOI：
10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00702.x
复制
发表时间：
1986
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Liebrand
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Wilke;K. DeBoer;W. Liebrand
在大多数社会困境研究中（Dawes，1980），参与者都有平等的机会获得公共资源。在这项研究中，一个小组成员--掌权者--能够采取的结果是普通小组成员的三倍。在一半的群体中，权力拥有者的这种能力是通过先前的努力支出获得的（功绩条件）;在另一半的群体中，权力是篡夺的（篡夺条件）。Mulder的权力理论（Mulder，1972）预测权力质量的差异没有影响，而其他见解（例如Austin & Hatfield，1980）表明合法化对其他参与者的行为有影响。在一半的小组中，掌权者拿走的钱是普通小组成员的三倍。来自社会正义文献（Austin & Hatfield，1980）的见解表明，当权力拥有者获得的利益超过群体成员的平均水平时（即所谓的比例结果条件），正义的比例标准就会被引入。因此，他或她的同伴群体成员应采取较少的结果比在平等的结果条件下，在其中的权力持有人采取尽可能多的结果作为平均群体成员，其中平等的正义标准可以假设是由权力持有人介绍。使用2（篡夺与优点）× 2（比例与平等的结果）的设计，在社会困境的情况下，几个假设进行了测试。结果表明，穆德的质量的权力假设的支持，即合法化没有影响的“收获”的行为，经常组成员。然而，一个合法的掌权者后来比一个篡位者得到更多的社会支持（参见《罗马法》）。French & Raven，1959）。正义标准假说（Austin & Hatfield，1980）得到了支持，因为在比例结果条件下，普通群体成员比在平等结果条件下采取的结果更少。
In most social dilemma studies (Dawes, 1980), participants have equal access to the common resources. In this study one group member—the powerholder—was able to take three times as many outcomes as the average group member. In half of the groups this ability of the powerholder was acquired by previous effort expenditure (the merit condition); in the other half of the groups the power was usurped (the usurpation condition). Mulder's power theory (Mulder, 1972) predicts that difference in quality of power has no effect, while other insights (e.g. Austin & Hatfield, 1980) suggest that legitimation has an impact on the behaviour of other participants. In half of the groups the powerholder took three times as much as the average group member. Insights derived from social justice literature (Austin & Hatfield, 1980) suggest that when the powerholder takes more than the average fellow group member—this being so in the so-called proportional outcomes condition—then the proportionality standard of justice will be introduced. Consequently, his or her fellow group members should take fewer outcomes than in the equal outcomes condition, in which the powerholder takes as many outcomes as the average group member and in which the equality standard of justice may be assumed to be introduced by the powerholder. Using a 2 (usurpation vs. merit) x 2 (proportional vs. equal outcomes) design, several hypotheses were tested in a social dilemma situation. The results indicate that Mulder's quality of power hypothesis was supported, i.e. legitimation had no effect on the ‘harvesting’ behaviour of regular group members. However, a legitimate powerholder later received more social support than a usurper (cf. French & Raven, 1959). The standard of justice hypothesis (Austin & Hatfield, 1980) was sustained, since regular group members in the proportional outcomes condition took fewer outcomes than those in the equal outcomes condition.