Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
复制标题
DOI：
10.1007/s00712-017-0563-3
复制
发表时间：
2017-08
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Shohei Yoshida
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shohei Yoshida
本文研究了议价能力对下游企业利润的影响。考虑一个垂直相关的产业，由一个上游和两个下游企业组成，后者有不同的边际成本。每一对都在一个线性批发价格上讨价还价，然后下游企业参与古诺竞争。我们表明，低效率的下游企业可能会受益于上游企业的议价能力的增加。此外，我们得到类似的结果时，每个下游企业与其独家上游代理商，在非线性需求函数，或当下游企业在价格竞争。
This paper investigates the effects of bargaining power on downstream firms’ profits. Consider a vertically related industry consisting of one upstream and two downstream firms, the latter having different marginal costs. Each pair bargains over a linear wholesale price, and then the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. We show that the inefficient downstream firm may benefit from an increase in the bargaining power of the upstream firm. Furthermore, we obtain similar results when each downstream firm trades with its exclusive upstream agent, under non-linear demand function, or when downstream firms compete in price.