Fiscal Federalism and Capital Accumulation
Fiscal Federalism and Capital Accumulation
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财政联邦制与资本积累
DOI：
10.1111/1097-3923.00009
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
J. Brueckner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Brueckner
本文通过一个世代重叠的模型考察了财政联邦制对资本积累和增长的影响。通过放宽单一系统的统一消费要求，财政联邦主义允许经济对年轻人和老年人之间的公共利益需求做出不同的反应。对于年轻人和老年人来说，当他们的不同需求得到满足时，公共物品水平和税收走向相反的方向，这导致了两个群体私人物品消费的相反变化。这些变化扰乱了私人消费的首选时间路径，而这种路径可以通过改变储蓄来恢复。这一变化反过来又改变了经济的均衡资本强度，在向新均衡过渡的过程中出现了增长效应。版权所有1999年，布莱克韦尔出版公司。
This paper explores the effect of fiscal federalism on capital accumulation and growth in an overlapping-generations model. By relaxing the uniform-consumption requirement of a unitary system, fiscal federalism allows the economy to respond to a difference in public-good demands between young and old. Public-good levels and taxes move in opposite directions for the young and old as their different demands are fulfilled, and this leads to opposing changes in private-good consumption for the two groups. These changes disrupt the preferred time path of private consumption, which is restored by a change in saving. This change in turn alters the equilibrium capital intensity of the economy, and growth effects emerge during the transition to the new equilibrium. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.