Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions
Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1040.0286
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发表时间：
2004-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Robert F. Easley;Rafael Tenorio
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Robert F. Easley;Rafael Tenorio
互联网拍卖中常见的竞价策略是“跳跃竞价”，即输入的出价高于当前中标者所需的出价。在本文中，我们认为，与进入在线投标相关的成本和未来进入的不确定性（两者都是互联网与现场拍卖的区别）可以解释这种行为。我们提出了一个包含上述特征的简单理论模型，并推导了以在线交易常用的形式（升价拍卖）出现跳跃竞价的条件。我们还提供了从数百次互联网拍卖中记录的证据，这些证据与我们模型的一些基本预测一致。我们发现，跳跃竞价更有可能在拍卖的早期进行，此时跳跃竞价具有更大的战略价值，并且随着竞争的加剧，跳跃竞价的动机也会增加。我们的结果还表明，跳跃竞价是有效的：跳跃竞价者总体出价较少，而早期跳跃竞价的增加会阻止后期进入拍卖。我们还讨论了降低投标成本的可能方法以及互联网拍卖商正在追求这一目标的证据。
Abidding strategy commonly observed in Internet auctions is that of "jump bidding," or entering a bid larger than what is necessary to be a currently winning bidder. In this paper, we argue that the cost associated with entering online bids and the uncertainty about future entry--both of which distinguish Internet from live auctions--can explain this behavior. We present a simple theoretical model that includes the preceding characteristics, and derive the conditions under which jump bidding arises in a format commonly used for online trading, the ascending-price auction. We also present evidence, recorded from hundreds of Internet auctions, that is consistent with some of the basic predictions from our model. We find that jump bidding is more likely earlier in an auction, when jumping has a larger strategic value, and that the incentives to jump bid increase as competition increases. Our results also indicate that jump bidding is effective: Jump bidders place fewer bids overall, and increased early jump bidding deters entry later in the auction. We also discuss possible means of reducing bidding costs and evidence that Internet auctioneers are pursuing this goal.