Why do state-owned enterprises over-invest? Government intervention or managerial entrenchment
Why do state-owned enterprises over-invest? Government intervention or managerial entrenchment
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DOI：
10.1080/21697221.2013.867401
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发表时间：
2013-12
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jun Bai;Lishuai Lian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jun Bai;Lishuai Lian
在转型经济中，公司投资决策不仅受到管理者自由裁量权的影响，而且还受到政府干预的影响。本文利用中国国有上市公司的数据，研究了政府干预和公司管理防御对过度投资的影响。研究结果表明，政府干预的政策性负担和管理防御的寻租行为均会导致过度投资，且两者的作用具有互补性。在政府干预较弱的情况下，管理者的自由裁量权较大，管理行为倾向于机会主义。
In a transition economy, corporate investment decisions are affected not only by managerial discretion, but also by government intervention. Using the data of publicly listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, we investigate how government intervention and corporate managerial entrenchment affect over-investment. The results show that both the policy burden from government intervention and rent-seeking due to managerial entrenchment can lead to over-investments, and these two effects appear to be complementary to each other. With a weak government intervention, managerial discretion is greater and management behavior tends toward opportunism.