Strength of Protection for Geographical Indications: Promotion Incentives and Welfare Effects
Strength of Protection for Geographical Indications: Promotion Incentives and Welfare Effects
复制标题
地理标志保护力度：推广激励与福利效应
DOI：
10.1093/ajae/aau016
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Gian Carlo Moschini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Menapace;Gian Carlo Moschini
我们解决的问题，如何保护地理标志（地理标志）的强度影响地理标志产业的推广激励，均衡的市场结果，和福利分配。地理标志生产商通过将其真正的质量溢价（相对于替代产品）与强调地理标志地理来源的具体标签联系起来，进行信息性广告。GI标签的名称/文字可被竞争产品使用和/或模仿的程度（取决于GI保护的强度）决定了GI宣传信息的信息量。消费者的异质性偏好（相对于A-维斯于GI质量溢价）建模在一个垂直差异化的框架。地理标志产业和替代产品产业都被认为是竞争性的（自由进入）。该模型进行校准和解决替代参数值。结果表明，生产者的地理标志和低质量的替代品有不同的利益：地理标志生产者是更好的充分保护，而替代品的生产者更喜欢中间水平的保护（但他们从来没有喜欢零保护，因为他们间接受益，如果地理标志生产者的激励措施，以促进保存）。对于消费者和总体福利而言，优选的保护水平取决于模型的参数，在许多情况下，中间保护水平是最佳的。
We address the question of how the strength of protection for geographical indications (GIs) affects the GI industry's promotion incentives, equilibrium market outcomes, and the distribution of welfare. Geographical indication producers engage in informative advertising by associating their true quality premium (relative to a substitute product) with a specific label emphasizing the GI's geographic origin. The extent to which the names/words of the GI label can be used and/or imitated by competing products-which depends on the strength of GI protection-determines how informative the GI promotion messages can be. Consumers' heterogeneous preferences (vis-A -vis the GI quality premium) are modeled in a vertically differentiated framework. Both the GI industry and the substitute product industry are assumed to be competitive (with free entry). The model is calibrated and solved for alternative parameter values. Results show that producers of the GI and of the lower-quality substitute good have divergent interests: GI producers are better off with full protection, whereas the substitute good's producers prefer intermediate levels of protection (but they never prefer zero protection because they benefit indirectly if the GI producers' incentives to promote are preserved). For consumers and aggregate welfare, the preferred level of protection depends on the model's parameters, with an intermediate level of protection being optimal in many circumstances.