Implications of Incomplete Performance for Optimal Insurance
Implications of Incomplete Performance for Optimal Insurance
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DOI：
10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00393.x
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发表时间：
2004-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
O. Mahul;Brian D. Wright
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
O. Mahul;Brian D. Wright
我们调查的保险需求时，合同的主题，正概率，两种不同类型的不完全性能。当部分履行意味着在完全履行的情况下支付一部分赔偿时，后者显示出一个消失的免赔额。当部分履行是由于财务能力不足，最佳保险合同，任何给定水平的财务能力，提供完全的边际覆盖率以上的免赔额。对于任何一种不履约行为，当保险以精算公平价格提供时，在完全履约情况下的最佳免赔额为正。
We investigate the demand for insurance when contracts are subject, with positive probability, to two distinct types of incomplete performance. When partial performance means payment of some fraction of the indemnity under full performance, the latter exhibits a disappearing deductible. When partial performance is due to insufficient financial capacity, optimal insurance contracts, for any given level of financial capacity, offer full marginal coverage above a deductible. For either type of non-performance, the optimal deductible under full performance is positive when insurance is offered at an actuarially fair price.