Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship
Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship
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委托、主管、代理关系中的串通与重新谈判
DOI：
10.1111/1467-9442.00078
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Roland Strausz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Roland Strausz
作者描述了一种委托-管理-代理关系，在这种关系中，代理人和管理者可能相互勾结。为了防止共谋，当事人可以接触与共谋的发生相关的噪声信号。当信号信息量足够大时，委托人使用它，在均衡中不会发生共谋。然而，这些合同是事后低效的，只有当委托人承诺不重新谈判时才是最优的。在重新谈判的情况下，对于委托人来说，防止共谋并同时以信号为条件签订合同从来都不是最优的。事实上，当信号具有足够的信息量时，共谋会在均衡中发生。版权所有1997年由斯堪的纳维亚经济学杂志的编辑。
The authors describe a principal-supervisor-agent relationship in which agent and supervisor may collude. To prevent collusion, the principal may contract on a noisy signal which is correlated with the occurrence of collusion. When the signal is informative enough, the principal uses it and no collusion occurs in equilibrium. These contracts, however, are ex post inefficient and are only optimal if the principal can commit not to renegotiate. With renegotiation it is never optimal for the principal to prevent collusion and, at the same time, condition contracts on the signal. In fact, when the signal is informative enough, collusion occurs in equilibrium. Copyright 1997 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.