Contingent Decision Making in the Social World: The “Mental Ruler” Model
Contingent Decision Making in the Social World: The “Mental Ruler” Model
复制标题
社会世界中的偶然决策：“心理统治者”模型
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-015-9827-9_8
复制
发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Takemura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Takemura
在复杂的社会环境中，人们在各种情况下做出判断或决定（Fischhoff，1996; Klein，Orasanu，Calderwood，& Zsambok，！993）。效用理论是解释各种决策现象的代表性理论体系。它使用数学方法，经常被引入政治经济学领域的消费者活动研究。虽然效用理论可以解释大多数决策现象，但它不能完全解释由于问题描述（例如，Tversky & Kahneman，1981），决策程序（例如，Tversky，Slovic，& Kahneman，1990）和外部任务因素（例如，Payne，Bettman，&约翰逊，1993; Selart，1997）而导致的偶然决策。例如，正如特沃斯基和卡尼曼（Tversky and Kahneman，1981）所说明的，即使在相同的客观情况下形成了完全相同的选择，所做出的决定也可能是不同的，这取决于心理表征被创造的方式。本章将首先解释为什么效用理论不能完全解释权变决策。第二，决策框架模型（Tversky & Kahneman. 1981）以及心理钱包模型（Kojima，1959; Kojima，1994）将从一个关键的观点引入;最后，将引入一个新的权变决策模型，因为如上所述，效用理论（包括非线性效用理论，如秩相关效用理论）经常被违反。心理标尺模型假设人们主观地构建环境，以便创建一个简单的一维心理标尺，然后使用这样创建的标尺做出决策。这种在决策情境中灵活创造的一维心理标尺，可以增强问题解决的适应性和有效性。另一方面，一个心理标尺如果不灵活地应用于决策情境中，则可能会导致功能固定，并因为固定的一维性而阻碍创造性问题解决。这个问题将在以后讨论。并非所有的决定都是一维的;相反，尽管物体具有多维性，但在自然主义情境中，人们为了科普社会世界的复杂性，可能会相当频繁地做出一维决定。当然，在某些情况下，多维判断和决策是由各种传统决策理论假设的。这一章是基于一个早期的讨论文件，题为“自然主义决策中的创造性过程的心理模型：其定性和数学表示”（武村。1998年b）。然而，由于编辑原因，本章删除了模型的数学描述。
People judge or make decisions in various situations in complex social settings (Fischhoff, 1996; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok,! 993). Utility theory is a representative system for explaining various decision making phenomena. It uses mathematical methods and is introduced frequently in consumer activity research in the field of political economy. Although utility theory can explain most decision making phenomena, it cannot completely explain contingent decision making due to problem description (eg, Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), decision procedure (eg, Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990), and external task factors (eg, Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Selart, 1997). For example, as Tversky and Kahneman (1981) illustrate, even if the completely same alternatives are formed in the same objective situation, the decision made may be different, depending on the way in which a mental representation is created. This chapter will first explain why utility theory cannot completely explain contingent decision making. Secondly, the decision frame model (Tversky & Kahneman. 1981) as well as the psychological purse model (Kojima, 1959; Kojima, 1994) will be introduced from a critical stand point; and finally, a new model of contingent decision making will be introduced, since utility theories (including such nonlinear utility theories as the rankdependent utility theory) are often violated as pointed out above. The mental ruler model assumes that people subjectively construct circumstance in order to create a simple one-dimensional mental ruler, then make decisions using the ruler so created. This one-dimensional mental ruler flexibly created in the decision-making situation may enhance the adaptiveness and effectiveness of problem solving. On the other hand, a mental ruler which is inf1exibly applied to the decision-making situation may cause functional fixation and block creative problem solving because of the fixed onedimensionality. This problem will be discussed later. Not all decisions are one-dimensional; rather, despite the multi-dimensional nature of an object, there is a possibility that onedimensional decisions are made with considerable frequency in naturalistic situations in order for people to cope with the complexities of the social world. Multi-dimensional judgments and decisions are of course made in some cases as assumed by various conventional decision theories.** This c hapter is based on a revision of an e arlier discussion paper entitled" A mental model of creative process in naturalistic decision making: Its qualitative and mathematical representations"(Takemura. 1998b). However, mathematical descriptions of the model were eliminated in this chapter for editorial reasons.