A Companion to Wittgenstein
A Companion to Wittgenstein
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维特根斯坦的同伴
DOI：
10.1002/9781118884607.ch29
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Child W
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文献类型：
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作者：
Child W
本章区分了维特根斯坦关于心灵哲学的著作中“内在”和“外在”这两个术语的两种用法。它通过探索维特根斯坦对图像的起源和吸引力的描述，他拒绝它的原因，以及他自己非常不同的常识心理学思维方式来讨论内外图像。本章考虑了他对我们与自己的经验和态度的关系的描述，并讨论了他的建议，即像“我很痛苦”或“我想要一个苹果”这样的话语是一个人的经验和态度的公开声明或表达。论述了维特根斯坦对“内在”心理状态与“外在”行为之间关系的肯定观点。正如维特根斯坦所描述的那样，内-外图景具有形而上学和认识论的维度。内-外图景鼓励这样一种观点，即我们在当前经验和态度的自我归属中使用语言与在谈论非精神世界时使用语言类似。
This chapter distinguishes two uses of the terms “inner” and “outer” in Wittgenstein's writings on philosophy of mind. It discusses the inner‐outer picture by exploring Wittgenstein's account of the origin and appeal of the picture, his reasons for rejecting it, and his own very different way of thinking of common‐sense psychology. The chapter considers his account of our relation to our own experiences and attitudes, and discusses his suggestion that utterances like 'I'm in pain' or 'I want an apple' are avowals or expressions of a person's experiences and attitudes. It discusses Wittgenstein's positive view of the relation between “inner” mental states and “outer” behavior. The inner–outer picture, as Wittgenstein describes it, has a metaphysical and an epistemic dimension. The inner–outer picture encourages the view that our use of language in self‐ascriptions of current experiences and attitudes is analogous to its use in talking about the non‐mental world.