HYPER-RATIONAL GAMING
HYPER-RATIONAL GAMING
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超理性游戏
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mitchel Y. Abolafia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mitchel Y. Abolafia
大量且不断增长的博弈论文献表明，各种各样的人类冲突和竞争都可以建模为博弈。这项工作大部分是通过演绎逻辑、数学建模和计算机模拟来完成的。它基于这样的假设：人类是自利的理性最大化者。这项研究考察了一组被给予非凡激励和资源的参与者，他们将自己的理性运用到竞技游戏中。研究对象是华尔街十大投资银行中四家的 54 名债券交易员。作者探索了债券交易者之间的超理性博弈，以确定博弈论模型的描述性局限性和文化扩展。
A vast and growing literature in game theory shows that a wide variety of human conflicts and competitions can be modeled as games. Most of this work is done through deductive logic, mathematical modeling, and computer simulation. It relies on the assumption that humans are self-interested rational maximizers. This study examines a group of actors who are given extraordinary incentives and resources to apply their rationality to a competitive game. The subjects were fifty-four bond traders at four of the ten largest investment banks on Wall Street. The author explores hyper-rational gaming among bond traders to identify descriptive limitations and cultural extensions of the game theoretic model.