What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?
What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?
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理想理论的理想是什么？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zofia Stemplowska
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zofia Stemplowska
政治理论家的主要任务之一是构建理论，即所谓的理想理论，这在他们之间引起了激烈的争论。这些理论有一个共同的特点：他们所说的大部分内容都没有为我们社会面临的任何问题提供直接或可行的解决方案。这一特征不是理论家们努力实现的，但也不能将其描述为偶然的特征：这些理论是在充分认识到，无论它们可能提供什么，它们所说的大部分内容都不会立即适用于政策和制度设计等紧迫问题的情况下构建的。由于这似乎令人困惑，并受到严厉的批评，本文的主要任务是询问理想理论的要点是什么，并表明其价值的本质。我还将论证，虽然关于理想理论观点的辩论可能是富有成效的，但只有当我们避免将理想理论和非理想理论视为政治理论的敌对方法时，才会如此。我的论点将展开如下。在第一节中，我首先概述了关于理想理论和非理想理论之间区别的争论的背景。在此过程中，我将集中讨论Colin Farrelly和Charles W. Mills最近对理想理论提出的两项批评，希望表明他们没有击中目标。然后，在第二节中，我将提出为什么我们可能想要将理想理论定义为不能提出如何改善我们的社会的建议的理论，这些建议适用于我们现在。我将在这里论证，虽然理想理论和非理想理论可以被有益地区分开来，但许多（如果不是全部的话）正义理论，比如罗尔斯的国内正义理论，在理想和非理想层面上同时运作。在第3节中，我将回顾并拒绝区分理想理论和非理想理论的另一种建议，并为理想理论辩护，使其免受好的规范理论应该避免依赖错误假设的批评。最后，在第4节中，我将解释理想理论的观点，它不提出如何改善我们的社会的建议，适用于我们这里和现在。
One of the main tasks that occupies political theorists, and arouses intense debate among them, is the construction of theories—so-called ideal theories—that share a common characteristic: much of what they say offers no immediate or workable solutions to any of the problems our societies face. This feature is not one that theorists strive to achieve but nor can it be described as an accidental one: these theories are constructed in the full knowledge that, whatever else they may offer, much of what they say will not be immediately applicable to the urgent problems of policy and institutional design. Since this may seem puzzling, and has been subjected to severe criticism, the main task of this paper is to ask what is the point of ideal theory and to show the nature of its value. I will also argue that, while the debate over the point of ideal theory can be productive, it will only be so if we avoid treating ideal and nonideal theories as rival approaches to political theory. My argument will unfold as follows. I begin in section 1 by sketching the background of the debate over the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. In doing so I will concentrate on two recent critiques of ideal theory developed by Colin Farrelly and Charles W. Mills, hoping to show that they miss their target. I will then, in section 2, suggest why we may want to define ideal theory as theory that fails to issue recommendations for how to improve our society that are applicable for us here and now. I will argue there that while ideal and nonideal theory can be profitably distinguished, many, if not all, theories of justice, such as Rawls’s theory of domestic justice, operate simultaneously at the ideal and nonideal level. In section 3 I will review and reject an alternative suggestion for distinguishing between ideal and nonideal theory and defend ideal theory from the criticism that good normative theory should eschew relying on false assumptions. Finally, in section 4, I will explain the point of ideal theory that does not issue recommendations for how to improve our society that are applicable for us here and now.