Incentives and Innovation: A Multitasking Approach
Incentives and Innovation: A Multitasking Approach
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DOI：
10.1257/mic.3.1.78
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发表时间：
2011-02-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Thiele, Veikko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hellmann, Thomas;Thiele, Veikko
本文开发了一个多任务模型，员工之间的选择，他们分配的标准任务，公司有一个性能指标，并提供激励措施，并私下观察到的创新机会，属于性能指标之外，并需要事后讨价还价。如果创新是高度企业特定的，企业提供较低的动力激励标准任务，以鼓励更多的创新，但在均衡员工进行太少的创新。如果创新不那么具体，情况就会相反。我们还调查了几种可能性，以鼓励创新的有效性，如容忍失败，股票为基础的补偿，和知识产权的分配。(JEL D21、J33、M12、O31、O34）
This paper develops a multitask model where employees make choices between their assigned standard tasks, for which the firm has a performance measure and provides incentives, and privately observed innovation opportunities that fall outside of the performance metrics, and require ex post bargaining. If innovations are highly firm specific, firms provide lower-powered incentives for standard tasks to encourage more innovation, yet in equilibrium employees undertake too few innovations. The opposite occurs if innovations are less firm specific. We also investigate the effectiveness of several possibilities to encourage innovation, such as tolerance for failure, stock-based compensation, and the allocation of intellectual property rights. (JEL D21, J33, M12, O31, O34)