Supervisory Control under Local Mean Payoff Constraints
Supervisory Control under Local Mean Payoff Constraints
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DOI：
10.1109/cdc40024.2019.9029301
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发表时间：
2019-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yiding Ji;Xiang Yin;S. Lafortune
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yiding Ji;Xiang Yin;S. Lafortune
本文研究加权离散事件系统的局部平均支付目标的定量监督控制。权重流是由系统产生的，必须设计一个监督程序，以确保在系统运行时，在固定数量的转换上权重的平均收益永远不会低于给定的阈值。局部平均收益可以被看作是权重流的稳定性度量。我们制定的监督控制问题，并将其转换为一个两个玩家之间的监管和环境的游戏。其次，定义了窗口支付函数来描述监督者在博弈中的目标。然后，我们分析了游戏，并开发了一种方法来合成游戏获胜的监督，解决了所提出的问题。
This work investigates quantitative supervisory control with a local mean payoff objective for weighted discrete event systems. Weight flows are generated by the system and a supervisor must be designed to ensure that the mean payoff of weights over a fixed number of transitions never drops below a given threshold while the system is operating. The local mean payoff may be viewed as a stability measure of weight flows. We formulate the supervisory control problem and transform it to a two-player game between the supervisor and the environment. Next, window payoff functions are defined to characterize the objective for the supervisor in the game. Then we analyze the game and develop a method to synthesize game-winning supervisors, which solve the proposed problem.