Strategic complexity and cooperation: An experimental study
Strategic complexity and cooperation: An experimental study
复制标题
战略复杂性与合作：实验研究
DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.005
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Matthew T. Jones
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Matthew T. Jones
本研究探讨在一个无限期重复的囚徒困境中，合作是否对合作策略的复杂性敏感。一个实验设计，它允许操纵的复杂性，这些策略，无论是合作行动或缺陷行动状态依赖。当合作策略的复杂性增加时，被试更不可能使用合作策略，而更可能使用简单的自私策略。这种效果的鲁棒性得到了支持的发现，合作下降福尔斯，即使当缺陷的行动是国家依赖的，这增加了惩罚强制合作策略的复杂性。被试的标准化测试成绩和合作的可能性之间的联系被发现，表明更大的认知能力，使受试者更有可能使用复杂的策略。
This study investigates whether cooperation in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is sensitive to the complexity of cooperative strategies. An experimental design which allows manipulations of the complexity of these strategies by making either the cooperate action or the defect action state-dependent is used. Subjects are found to be less likely to use a cooperative strategy and more likely to use a simpler selfish strategy when the complexity of cooperative strategies is increased. The robustness of this effect is supported by the finding that cooperation falls even when the defect action is made state-dependent, which increases the complexity of punishment-enforced cooperative strategies. A link between subjects’ standardized test scores and the likelihood of cooperating is found, indicating that greater cognitive ability makes subjects more likely to use complex strategies.