Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model
Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model
复制标题
新古典增长模型中的内生腐败
DOI：
10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00052-x
复制
发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
R. Barreto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Barreto
本文提出了一个简单的新古典增长模型，其中腐败是公共代理人和私人代理人之间竞争的内生结果。该模型提供了一个简单的理论框架，其中腐败水平以及腐败对收入、消费和增长的影响是可识别的。然后，官僚主义的繁文缛节被添加到模型中。结果表明，就增长而言，腐败既不会提高效率，也不会降低效率，但总会导致某种程度的收入再分配。
The following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent. The model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income, consumption, and growth are identifiable. Bureaucratic red-tape is then added to the model. The results suggest that, a priori, corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution.