Tax design in the alcohol market
Tax design in the alcohol market
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.12.005
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发表时间：
2019-04-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Smith, Kate
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Griffith, Rachel;O'Connell, Martin;Smith, Kate
酒精消费产生负外部性，这在酒精消费总量中是非线性的。如果人们对产品的品味是异质的，并且与边际外部性相关，那么对不同产品征收不同的税率就能带来福利收益。我们在英国市场的最优税收框架下研究了这个问题。我们发现，重度饮酒者的酒精需求模式存在系统性差异，且外部性在重度饮酒者中越集中，从最优变化率中获得的福利收益就越高。(C) 2018年作者。这是一篇基于CC by-nc-nd许可（http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/）的开放获取文章。
Alcohol consumption generates negative externalities that are non-linear in the total amount of alcohol consumed. If tastes for products are heterogeneous and correlated with marginal externalities, then varying tax rates on different products can lead to welfare gains. We study this problem in an optimal tax framework and empirically for the UK market. We find that heavy drinkers have systematically different patterns of alcohol demands and welfare gains from optimally varying rates are higher the more concentrated externalities are among heavy drinkers. (C) 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).