Delayed privatization
Delayed privatization
复制标题
延迟私有化
DOI:
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发表时间:
2008
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
P. Pinotti
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Bernardo Bortolotti;P. Pinotti
This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977–2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government’s decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.