Regulation, Public Interest, and Private Interest: An Empirical Investigation of Firms in Japan
Regulation, Public Interest, and Private Interest: An Empirical Investigation of Firms in Japan
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监管、公共利益和私人利益：对日本企业的实证调查
DOI：
10.1007/s00181-017-1389-0
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
F. and E. Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mizutani;F. and E. Nakamura
本文运用实证研究方法，考察公共利益理论和私人利益理论在多大程度上分别解释了实际的监管过程。我们的估计结果如下：第一，平均而言（全行业），公共利益理论的解释力约为46- 78%，私人利益理论的解释力约为22- 54%。第二，公共利益理论对非公用事业行业的解释力更高，而私人利益理论对公用事业行业的解释力更高。这表明，对非公共事业的规制，如传统的新古典主义福利经济学所假设的那样，在很大程度上考虑到了社会福利，而对公共事业的规制，如私人利益理论所假设的那样，在很大程度上被私人团体所掌握。
By using empirical methodology, this paper investigates to what extent the public interest and the private interest theories, respectively, explain the actual regulatory process. Our estimation findings are as follows: First, on average (whole industry basis), the explanation power of the public interest theory is about 46– 78%, while that of the private interest theory is about 22–54%. Second, the explanatory power of the public interest theory is higher in non-public utility industries, while that of the private interest theory is higher in public utility industries. This suggests that regulations on non-public utility industry are constructed largely with social welfare in mind, as assumed in conventional neoclassical welfare economics, but that those in the public utility industry tend to be captured largely by private groups, as assumed in private interest theory.