Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation
Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation
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自我执行的代际社会契约帕累托改进污染减排
DOI：
10.1007/s10640-017-0155-2
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
O. Edenhofer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. T. Dao;Kerstin Burghaus;O. Edenhofer
在具有环境外部性的重叠代模型中，我们考虑任意连续两代之间的合同方案。根据每份合同，年轻一代的代理人将其劳动收入的一部分投资于污染减排，以换取他们生命第二阶段的转移。转移资金由下一代年轻一代以现收现付的方式提供资金。与之前的工作不同，我们假设转移支付是作为对资本收入的补贴而不是一次性支付。我们表明，对于任何两代人来说，存在一种相对于没有契约的情况帕累托改进的契约的存在需要足够高的收入水平。在每个时期有社会契约的稳态下，污染存量比没有契约的稳态要低。对纳什讨价还价动态的分析和数值分析表明，在合理的条件下，稳态收入和福利也更高。拖延社会契约的实施太久或强加减排量过低的合同可能会付出高昂的代价：净收入可能不可避免地在有限时间内低于阈值，从而帕累托改善减排不再可能，经济收敛到污染存量高、收入和福利低的稳定状态。在本文的第二部分中，我们研究了博弈论设置，考虑到可信地承诺合同可能是不可能的。我们表明，随着转移支付作为资本收入的补贴，存在缓解转移计划，这些计划既是帕累托改进，又不会激励任何一代人偏离任何合同，即使在动态高效的经济中也是如此。社会契约与私人储蓄共存。
We consider, in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality, a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations. Under each contract, agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives. The transfer is financed in a pay-as-you-go manner by the next young generation. Different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum. We show that the existence of a contract which is Pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income. In a steady state with social contracts in each period, the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts. Analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under Nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions, also steady state income and welfare are higher. Delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly: Net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that Pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare. In the second part of the paper, we study a game theoretic setup, taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible. We show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income, there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both Pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy. Social contracts coexist with private savings.