The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales
The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales
复制标题
高强度激励的成本：企业软件销售中的员工博弈
DOI：
10.1086/673371
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Ian Larkin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ian Larkin
本文研究了在一家领先的企业软件供应商中，由于使用常见的非线性激励方案而产生的定价扭曲。实证结果表明，销售人员善于博弈交易结束的时间，以利用供应商的加速佣金计划。具体来说，销售人员同意在有经济动机的季度大幅降低定价，从而导致定价错误，使供应商损失6%-8%的收入。稳健性检验表明，供应商的价格歧视不能解释已识别的影响。
This article investigates the pricing distortions that arise from the use of a common nonlinear incentive scheme at a leading enterprise software vendor. The empirical results demonstrate that salespeople are adept at gaming the timing of deal closure to take advantage of the vendor’s accelerating commission scheme. Specifically, salespeople agree to significantly lower pricing in quarters in which they have a financial incentive to close a deal, resulting in mispricing that costs the vendor 6%–8% of revenue. Robustness checks demonstrate that price discrimination by the vendor does not explain the identified effects.