Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions
Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.2014.2142
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发表时间：
2016-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Nicolas Fugger;Elena Katok;A. Wambach
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nicolas Fugger;Elena Katok;A. Wambach
尽管具有约束力的反向拍卖在学术文献中引起了很大的兴趣，但在实践中，动态的非约束性反向拍卖是采购中的常态。在这些中，供应商提交报价，并可以在现场拍卖活动期间对其竞争对手的报价做出回应。然而，最低报价并不一定决定获胜者。买方在竞赛后根据进一步的供应商信息决定谁将获得合同。我们从理论上和经验上都表明，这种投标形式使供应商能够串通，从而导致非竞争性的价格。该论文被行为经济学教授 Teck-Hua Ho 接收。
Although binding reverse auctions have attracted a good deal of interest in the academic literature, in practice, dynamic nonbinding reverse auctions are the norm in procurement. In those, suppliers submit price quotes and can respond to quotes of their competitors during a live auction event. However, the lowest quote does not necessarily determine the winner. The buyer decides after the contest, taking further supplier information into account, on who will be awarded the contract. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that this bidding format enables suppliers to collude, thus leading to noncompetitive prices. This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.