Tax evasion in new disguise? Examining tax havens' international bank deposits
Tax evasion in new disguise? Examining tax havens' international bank deposits
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新变相逃税？
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.06.003
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Jakob Miethe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lukas Menkhoff;Jakob Miethe
最近减少国际逃税的努力侧重于与避税天堂的信息交换。使用 2003 年：I 至 2017 年：IV 的平衡季度面板中 1397 个国家/地区的双边银行数据，我们首先表明，与避税天堂签订的按需信息条约使避税天堂的银行存款减少了 27.5%。其次，签署此类条约后，来自高税收国家避税天堂的存款也会减少，这为当局提供了第二个角度来侦查逃税行为。这两种反应都会随着时间的推移而消散，2010 年之后签署的条约也不会引发进一步的反应。这些结果不能仅用存款转移来解释，而且我们没有发现转变为合法性的证据。第三，最近基于银行信息自动交换的政策举措导致了与早期条约非常相似的初步反应，与逃税者的调整一致。这表明逃税者通过使用新的伪装来隐藏其真实收入来适应既定的信息交换条约，并对新措施再次做出反应。这些结果使人们对当前信息交换形式应对国际逃税的有效性产生了怀疑。
Recent efforts to reduce international tax evasion focus on information exchange with tax havens. Using bilateral bank data for 1397 countrypairs in a balanced quarterly panel from 2003:I to 2017:IV, we first show that information-on-request treaties with tax havens reduce bank deposits in tax havens by 27.5%. Second, also deposits from tax havens in high tax countries decline after such treaties are signed, giving authorities a second angle to detect tax evasion. Both reactions dissipate overt time and treaties signed after 2010 trigger no further reactions. These results cannot be explained by deposit shifting alone and we find no evidence of transitioning into legality. Third, recent policy initiatives based on the automatic exchange of bank information lead to very similar initial reactions as earlier treaties, consistent with adjustments on the part of tax evaders. This suggests that tax evaders adapt to established information exchange treaties by using new disguises to hide their true income, and react again to new measures. These results cast doubt on the effectiveness of current forms of information exchange to tackle international tax evasion.