The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY
The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY
复制标题
新的相关替代理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jonathan Vogel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jonathan Vogel
最近认识论中的一个突出主题是，对知识的要求是有限的，并依赖于上下文。相关选择理论（Relevant Alternatives Theory，RAT）是对这一观点的系统阐述。自Fred Dretske和Alvin Goldman提出以来，RAT经历了重大的演变，现在已被广泛接受。但我认为，目前形式的理论（“新相关替代理论”）存在严重缺陷。作为对怀疑论的回应，它是失败的，作为对我们知道什么和如何知道的积极解释，它是站不住脚的。
A prominent theme in much recent epistemology is that the requirements for knowledge are limited and context-dependent. The Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) is a systematic articulation of this point of view. Since it was put forward by Fred Dretske and Alvin Goldman, the RAT has undergone significant evolution, and it now enjoys broad acceptance. But I will argue that the theory in its current form (the "New Relevant Alternatives Theory") is deeply defective. It fails as a response to skepticism, and is untenable as a positive account of what and how we know.