Strengthening Digital Signatures Via Randomized Hashing
Strengthening Digital Signatures Via Randomized Hashing
复制标题
通过随机散列增强数字签名
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Krawczyk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Halevi;H. Krawczyk
我们提出了随机散列作为用于加密散列函数的操作模式，该加密散列函数旨在与标准数字签名一起使用，并且不需要底层散列函数的内部的任何改变（例如，SHA族）或签名算法（例如，RSA或DSA）。其目的是使实际的数字签字方案摆脱目前对强抗碰撞性的依赖，办法是使这些方案的安全性建立在基本散列函数的明显较弱的性质上，从而提供一个安全网，以防（目前或将来）使用的散列函数对碰撞搜索的弹性比最初设想的要小。
我们设计了一个特定的操作模式，考虑到工程考虑（如简单性，效率和与现有实现的兼容性）以及分析的合理性。具体地说，该方案包括定期使用散列函数，其中随机化仅应用于输入到散列函数之前的消息。我们正式证明了弱于碰撞阻力的假设证明该计划的安全性的充分性。
We propose randomized hashing as a mode of operation for cryptographic hash functions intended for use with standard digital signatures and without necessitating of any changes in the internals of the underlying hash function (e.g., the SHA family) or in the signature algorithms (e.g., RSA or DSA). The goal is to free practical digital signature schemes from their current reliance on strong collision resistance by basing the security of these schemes on significantly weaker properties of the underlying hash function, thus providing a safety net in case the (current or future) hash functions in use turn out to be less resilient to collision search than initially thought.
We design a specific mode of operation that takes into account engineering considerations (such as simplicity, efficiency and compatibility with existing implementations) as well as analytical soundness. Specifically, the scheme consists of a regular use of the hash function with randomization applied only to the message before it is input to the hash function. We formally show the sufficiency of weaker than collision-resistance assumptions for proving the security of the scheme.