Secrecy and Patents: Theory and Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Secrecy and Patents: Theory and Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
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保密与专利：《统一商业秘密法》的理论和证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2617266
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
I. Png
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
I. Png
更强的商业秘密法以相互矛盾的方式影响专利。它提高了商业化的回报，增加了对发明的利用，因此，增加了专利。然而，对于每一项特定的发明，企业可以用保密代替专利。在这里，我利用美国各州《统一商业秘密法》（UTSA）实施时间的差异以及对研发地理分布不同的制造商的影响，研究更强的商业秘密法对专利申请的影响。UTSA在复杂技术行业的专利减少了19.5%，但在离散技术行业没有显着影响。此外，UTSA与技术落后的大公司和竞争力较弱的行业中较大发明的专利申请相对减少有关。
Stronger trade secrets law affects patenting in conflicting ways. It raises the return to commercialization and increases the exploitation of inventions, and so, increases patenting. However, for each particular invention, businesses may substitute secrecy for patents. Here, I exploit differences in the timing of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in U.S. states and the impact on manufacturers with different geographic distribution of R&D to study the effect of stronger trade secrets law on patenting. The UTSA was associated with 19.5 percent fewer patents in complex technology industries but no significant effect in discrete technology industries. Further, the UTSA was associated with relatively greater reduction of patenting of larger inventions, among larger companies which are technology laggards, and in less competitive industries.