On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests
On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests
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论竞赛中的进化稳定行为
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Leininger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Leininger
摘要。本文认为进化稳定策略（ESS）的解概念是竞争理论的一个适当的分析工具。此外，在竞争中，ESS总是不同于纳什均衡，纳什均衡是迄今为止竞争理论中占主导地位的解概念。最后，从纳什行为的角度对有限种群ESS竞争行为进行了解释。
Abstract.It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied.