LEARNING, MUTATION, AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES
LEARNING, MUTATION, AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES
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DOI：
10.2307/2951777
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发表时间：
1993-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
ROB, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
KANDORI, M;MAILATH, GJ;ROB, R
我们分析了一个进化模型与有限数量的球员和噪音或突变。策略的扩张和收缩通常与它们当前的相对成功联系在一起，但突变也存在，突变会扰乱系统的确定性进化。突变可能发生在每个时期，因此重点是持续突变的影响，而不是一次性突变。这些突变的影响是将均衡集急剧减少到我们所说的“长期均衡”。对于具有两个对称严格纳什均衡的2 × 2对称博弈，所选择的均衡满足（对于大种群）Harsanyi和Selten（1988）的风险优势准则。特别是，如果两个策略具有相等的安全水平，则选择帕累托占优纳什均衡，即使存在另一个严格纳什均衡。
We analyze an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with noise or mutations. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked-as usual-to their current relative success, but mutations-which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution-are present as well. Mutations can occur in every period, so the focus is on the implications of ongoing mutations, not a one-shot mutation. The effect of these mutations is to drastically reduce the set of equilibria to what we term ''long-run equilibria.'' For 2 x 2 symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the equilibrium selected satisfies (for large populations) Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) criterion of risk-dominance. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected, even though there is another strict Nash equilibrium.