International Organizations as Policy Advisors
International Organizations as Policy Advisors
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DOI：
10.1017/s0020818312000276
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发表时间：
2012-09-01
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Stone, Randall W.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fang, Songying;Stone, Randall W.
当国际组织的利益发生冲突时，如何说服各国政府采纳基于私人信息的政策建议？我们开发了一个说服的博弈论模型，该模型适用于任何政体类型，并且不依赖于国内选区约束的存在。在该模型中，一个国际组织（IO）和一个国内专家拥有关于危机的私人信息，但他们的偏好与政府的不同，政府必须选择是否将决策权委托给专家。如果国际机构能够发出可信的信号，就可以进行说服。我们发现，只有当国际组织和国内专家的偏好出现分歧，并且机构采取更温和的政策立场时，才会发生这种情况。这一结果与传统观点形成了对比，传统观点认为，国际组织发挥影响力的必要条件是获得具有一致偏好的国内选民的支持。我们的模型表明，两极分化的国内政治非但不会成为国际合作的障碍，反而可能是国际组织发挥有效影响力的必要条件。
How can international organizations persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations that are based on private information when their interests conflict? We develop a game-theoretic model of persuasion that applies regardless of regime type and does not rely on the existence of domestic constituency constraints. In the model, an international organization (IO) and a domestic expert have private information about a crisis, but their preferences diverge from those of the government, which must choose whether to delegate decision making to the expert. Persuasion can take place if the international institution is able to send a credible signal. We find that this can take place only if the preferences of the IO and the domestic expert diverge and the institution holds the more moderate policy position. This result contrasts with conventional wisdom, which holds that the necessary condition for IOs to exert influence is support from a domestic constituency with aligned preferences. Our model suggests that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence.