Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers
Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers
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DOI：
10.1016/j.omega.2006.04.003
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发表时间：
2008-10
影响因子：
6.9
通讯作者：
Dong-qing Yao;Xiaohang Yue;John J. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dong-qing Yao;Xiaohang Yue;John J. Liu
本文研究了由一个供应商和两个具有增值能力的异质零售商组成的供应链。每个零售商都完全了解自己的增值成本结构，这是未知的供应商和其他零售商。假设两个零售商之间不存在横向信息共享，我们建立了一个三阶段博弈框架的供应链模型。在第一阶段，每个零售商决定他是否愿意纵向披露他的私人成本信息的供应商。在第二阶段，供应商根据他所掌握的有关零售商的信息，向零售商公布批发价格。在第三阶段，零售商根据批发价格分别优化自己的零售价格和产品的附加值。在一定条件下，我们证明了均衡价格和附加值的存在。此外，我们得到的条件下，两个零售商都不愿意垂直与供应商分享他们的私人信息，以及条件下，两个零售商有动机透露他们的成本信息的供应商，从而导致整个供应链的双赢局面。
We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two value-adding heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer has full knowledge about his own value-added cost structure that is unknown to the supplier and the other retailer. Assuming there is no horizontal information sharing between two retailers, we model the supply chain with a three-stage game-theoretic framework. In the first stage each retailer decides if he is willing to vertically disclose his private cost information to the supplier. In the second stage, given the information he has about the retailers, the supplier announces the wholesale price to the retailers. In response to the wholesale price, in the third stage, the retailers optimize their own retail prices and the values added to the product, respectively. Under certain conditions, we prove the existence of equilibrium prices and added values. Furthermore, we obtain the condition under which both retailers are unwilling to vertically share their private information with the supplier, as well as the conditions under which both retailers have incentives to reveal their cost information to the supplier, thus leading to a win–win situation for the whole supply chain.